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PEOPLE V BERROA1
(decided November 21, 2002)
1. SYNOPSIS
In a unanimous decision penned by Judge Wesley, the New
York Court of Appeals reversed the Supreme Court of New York,
Appellate Division, First Department, and ordered a new trial for
Dario Berroa (hereinafter "Berroa" or "defendant") after opining
that defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel at his crim-
inal trial for murder in the second degree. 2 The court held that a
particular stipulation by defense counsel 3 amplified an existing con-
flict and did not constitute a legitimate trial strategy,4 thus breach-
ing defendant's federal and state constitutional rights to the
effective assistance of counsel.5
II. BACKGROUND
Berroa was arrested and indicted for theJune 22, 1994 murder
of Weber Lewis (hereinafter "Lewis" or "decedent") that occurred
at the corner of Hunts Point and Garrison avenues in Bronx
County, New York.6 The murder took place in broad daylight and
prosecution witness Lourdes Rodriguez testified at trial that she
"saw defendant point a gun at the decedent's head and fire the gun
at point-blank range into the decedent's face."' 7 Rodriguez claimed
that she was a mere six feet away from defendant when the incident
occurred and described defendant as having "black hair and
unique yellow-green eyes."8
The prosecution also called James Lopez who stated that he
was familiar with the defendant, whom he had seen selling drugs in
1. 99 N.Y.2d 134 (2002).
2. Id. at 143.
3. Id. at 137.
4. Id. at 142.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; N.Y.CONST. art. I, §6.
6. People v. Berroa, 733 N.Y.S.2d 52 (App. Div. 2001).
7. Id at 54.
8. Id.
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the area, and similarly testified that he "saw defendant walk up and
fire a shot into the decedent's face at point-blank range."9 Lopez
further testified that he believed the murder was the result of a turf
war between defendant and Lewis because the latter had been sell-
ing drugs in the area) 0 The "turf war" motive suggested by Lopez
was corroborated by decedent's brother, Wailly Lewis, who also tes-
tified that defendant had dark hair and unique "greenish" eyes."'
In light of the factual evidence concerning Berroa's appear-
ance, defendant's counsel decided to pursue a misidentification de-
fense. The prosecutor expressed concern that a misidentification
defense may imply an alibi and noted that no alibi defense notice
had been served. 12 In response, defendant's counsel confirmed that
an alibi defense was not being offered because "none of the wit-
nesses or defendant knew their whereabouts at the time of the
shooting.' 3 Further, defense counsel asserted that "[the witnesses']
testimony would be offered only to establish that defendant's hair
was a distinctive yellow-orange color at the time of the shooting"14
rather than "black" or "dark" hair as suggested by the prosecution's
witnesses.15
At trial, defendant called Vivian Rivera who testified that Ber-
roa's hair had been dyed an orange-yellow color when she had first
met him in 1992.16 Rivera further testified that defendant's hair was
still that distinctive, artificial color when he visited her at her home
in the Bronx in June of 1994, a few days before the shooting.' 7
Along with Berroa on this trip to Rivera's home in the Bronx was
his girlfriend, Iris Santiago, who similarly testified that Berroa's hair
had been dyed an orange-yellow color at the time of their visit and
prior thereto.' 8 However, the remainder of Santiago's testimony
9. Berroa, 733 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §250.20 requires the defense to serve notice of an alibi
defense in order to permit the prosecution to conduct an appropriate factual
investigation.
13. Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 136.
14. Id.
15. See Berroa, 733 N.Y.S.2d at 54; see also text at notes 8, and 11.





and the testimony of a third defense witness, Anna Torres, became
problematic for the defense as their statements constructed an ap-
parent alibi for Berroa.
On direct and cross-examination, Santiago testified that
aroundJune 20, 1994, she and Berroa traveled from Massachusetts
to New York, spent about an hour or so at Rivera's home in the
Bronx, and then headed for Philadelphia where they would be stay-
ing with defendant's sister, Anna Torres. 19 Santiago then testified
that she and defendant did not leave Philadelphia until after June
24, 1994, which was the date that they celebrated Anna Torres'
birthday.20 At this juncture, trial judge Peter Benitez held a confer-
ence and called defense counsel's attention to the unexpected alibi
testimony. Defense counsel reiterated that "none of the defense wit-
nesses had previously been able to recall their whereabouts on June
22, 1994 - the day of the shooting."
21
The prosecution requested that the court allow Santiago's testi-
mony to stand with the intention of dealing with the unanticipated
alibi testimony through further cross-examination. 22 However, the
prosecution also requested that Anna Torres be precluded from
discussing an alibi for defendant during her testimony. 23 The court
noted that fulfilling such a request may become difficult since
Torres' testimony about Berroa's hair color may be "inextricably
interwoven" with defendant's presence in Philadelphia in late June,
1994.24 The People withdrew their request for preclusion. 25
The trial judge then inquired with Berroa's counsel about
whether the defense witnesses had been encouraged to refrain
from disclosing their exculpatory information prior to trial.26 De-
fendant's counsel stated that "she nor any other attorney had en-
couraged their silence in this regard, and reiterated that the
witnesses had previously been unable to pinpoint defendant's
whereabouts on the day of the shooting."
27
19. Berroa, 733 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
20. Id. at 54-55.
21. Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 136.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 136-37.
24. Id at 137.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 137.
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In light of defense counsel's statement, the trial judge contem-
plated remedies in case the witnesses testified that they told defense
counsel about the alibi. He expressed concern that defense counsel
may be called as a witness to impeach one of the witnesses and sug-
gested that, if such situation were to arise, perhaps defense counsel
would stipulate that the witness did not tell her of an alibi.28 The
defense counsel agreed that this was a possible remedy, subject to
her objections with regard to the wording of the stipulation. 29
The trial resumed and Santiago testified on cross-examination
that she had told defendant's attorney that she was with defendant
in Philadelphia on the day of the shooting.30 Anna Torres then tes-
tified that "defendant was at her home [in Philadelphia] from June
20, 1994 through June 25, 1994 and that his hair was a yellow
color. '3 1 On cross-examination, Torres similarly testified that she
had specifically told defense counsel before trial that Berroa was at
her home in Philadelphia on June 22, 1994, the day Weber Lewis
was shot.3 2 Finally, the defense called defendant Dario Berroa to
the stand and he testified that he "had yellow-orange hair at the
time of the shooting and that he was in Philadelphia from June 20
to June 25 to celebrate his sister's birthday."33
The defense rested at the conclusion of Berroa's testimony and
Judge Benitez held a discussion with the prosecution and defense
counsel regarding a stipulation by defense counsel. The court and
the parties agreed to the following stipulation that was read to the
jury before the People's rebuttal case: "It is stipulated and agreed by
[defense counsel] that prior to their appearing in New York to give
testimony in this case, Miss Santiago and Miss Torres had spoken
with her and that neither Miss Santiago or Miss Torres told [de-
fense counsel] that the defendant Dario Berroa had been in Phila-
delphia specifically on June 22, 1994."
34
28. Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 137.
29. Berroa, 733 N.Y.S.2d at 55.
30. Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 137.
31. Berroa, 733 N.Y.S.2d at 56.
32. Id. at 55.
33. Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 137.
34. Id. The author wishes to point out that the stipulation in question does not
address whether Berroa had been able to identify his whereabouts at the time of the
shooting prior to trial. Thus, defense counsel's stipulation did not contradict defen-
[Vol. 47
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At the end of the trial, defense counsel presented her summa-
tion and pointed out that "from 'day one' she told the jury that the
pivot point of the case was misidentification. '35 With regard to the
alibi evidence, defense counsel stated that "the court would instruct
the jury concerning alibi testimony and that 'you can take it for
what you want, you can disregard it, you can look at it. You heard
my stipulation.' "36
Defendant Dario Berroa was convicted of second-degree mur-
der and sentenced to twenty-five years to life imprisonment.3 7 De-
fendant appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of New
York, Appellate Division, First Department, and argued that he was
denied effective assistance of counsel because of the stipulation that
his attorney entered with regard to the defense witnesses' alibi testi-
mony.38 More pointedly, Berroa argued that defense counsel's deci-
sion to stipulate was "improperly motivated by her desire to protect
her reputation for integrity, thereby creating a conflict, and depriv-
ing him of the effective assistance of counsel." 39 The court rejected
Berroa's claim and affirmed defendant's conviction by a vote of 4-
1.40
In order to show ineffective assistance of counsel under New
York law, the defendant has the burden of demonstrating that his
counsel's performance deviated from the performance that would
be expected of a reasonably competent attorney.41 Further, an un-
successful strategy does not indicate incompetent performance per
se42 and a defendant's failure to satisfy his burden of proof results
in a presumption that defense counsel acted competently.43 How-
ever, the appellate division also pointed out that an attorney's obli-
gation to vigorously represent her client's interests is coupled with,
dant's testimony and is not relevant to the issue in this case, which only concerns the
testimony of Iris Santiago and Anna Torres.
35. Berroa, 733 N.Y.S.2d at 56.
36. Id. at 93.
37. Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 138.
38. Berroa, 733 N.Y.S.2d at 56.
39. Id.
40. Berroa, 733 N.Y.S.2d 52 (App. Div. 2001) (Tom, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 56.
42. Id. at 59.
43. Id. at 56.
2003]
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as well as restricted by, an equally significant duty to prevent and
disclose frauds upon the court.
44
In denying defendant's ineffectiveness claim, the appellate di-
vision majority found that defense counsel's stipulation satisfied her
ethical obligation to the court45 and was the least damaging
method of handling the situation, thus forming a legitimate trial
strategy.46 A possible alternative would involve defense counsel be-
ing called as a witness to testify on the record about what had tran-
spired between herself and the defense witnesses prior to trial.
47
The appellate division majority surmised that "this testimony ...
would have undermined far more of the witnesses' testimony than
the limited portion addressed by the stipulation. ' 48 According to
the majority, the stipulation was the favorable alternative and "it
[was] logically incoherent to believe . . . that [defense counsel] la-
bored under improper motivations[.] "
49
In reaching its conclusion, the appellate division majority re-
lied upon mere cursory views of three cases, only one of which was
from a New York court. In People v. Beals,50 the Illinois Supreme
Court upheld a defendant's conviction where defense counsel had
entered into a stipulation in order to minimize the effect of con-
flicting defense witnesses' testimony.51 In State v. Crespo,52 the Su-
preme Court of Connecticut held that the employment of a
stipulation rather than an attorney's testimony is a viable and pref-
erable trial strategy when the information contained in the stipula-
tion could have been presented by the prosecution. 53 Finally, in
People v. Baldi,54 the New York Court of Appeals affirmed a convic-
tion against an ineffectiveness claim where the defense attorney tes-
44. Berroa, 733 N.Y.S.2d at 56.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 60.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 57.
50. 643 N.E.2d 789 (Ili. 1994).
51. Berroa, 733 N.Y.S.2d at 58.
52. 718 A.2d 925 (Conn. 1998).
53. Berroa, 733 N.Y.S.2d at 59.
54. 54 N.Y.2d 137 (1981).
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tified as a witness to identify inconsistencies in his client's testimony
and foster the defendant's insanity defense.
55
The appellate division majority synthesized the superficial prin-
ciples that it gleaned from Beals, Crespo, and Baldi56 and concluded
that Berroa's attorney's performance was not proven to deviate
from the objective reasonableness standard. The majority opined
that defense counsel's stipulation was in line with her ethical obliga-
tions, was not motivated by self-preservation, and evidenced a legiti-
mate trial strategy that had been supported by prior court
decisions. Therefore, Berroa's claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel was rejected and the conviction was affirmed.
57
III. DIscussIoN
Tom, J., granted defendant leave to appeal to the New York
Court of Appeals. 58 At issue for the court of appeals was whether
defense counsel's stipulation was necessary to ameliorate the incon-
sistency that had arisen, therefore constituting a legitimate trial
strategy, or if the stipulation served to augment the discrepancy be-
tween defense counsel's and defense witnesses' contentions,
thereby creating a conflict that impeded Berroa's defense.
After recounting the factual background of the case, the court
of appeals pinpointed its perspective for review and stated that "un-
like the majority and the dissent at the Appellate Division, we do
not view defense counsel's revelation of the witnesses' prior state-
ments to be based on either an overzealous defense of her reputa-
tion or the fulfillment of her ethical duties." 59 The court continued,
"[t]he attempt to remedy the dilemma that unfolded once the wit-
nesses testified - not defense counsel's reason for the disclosure - is
the appropriate focus of our analysis." 60 Viewing defendant's claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel in this light, the New York Court
of Appeals reversed the decision of the appellate division and or-
dered a new trial for defendant. 61
55. Berroa, 733 N.Y.S.2d at 59.
56. See Berroa, 733 N.Y.S.2d at 59; see also text at notes 51 - 53.
57. Id. at 61-62.
58. Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 138.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 143.
20031
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
The court announced that, in New York, the constitutional
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel ensures meaningful rep-
resentation that is free of conflict and devoted to the client's best
interests. 62 Further, the court noted that this right is impaired
when, "absent a defendant's informed consent, defense counsel
represents interests which are actually or potentially in conflict with
those of the defendant.' ' 63 In Berroa's case, defense counsel had
agreed to enter the stipulation 64 in order to circumvent the prospect
of being called as a witness to impeach two defense witnesses - Iris
Santiago and Anna Torres. According to the court, "[t]he use of
the stipulation in lieu of her testimony did not cure the conflict as
intended; in this case it exacerbated the conflict by eviscerating the
credibility of her client's witnesses and his defense.
'" 6 5
In its analysis, the court of appeals addressed and distinguished
the three cases that the appellate division superficially relied upon
in rendering its decision. The court first analyzed People v. Beals
66
and found that defense counsel did in fact enter a stipulation that
contradicted conflicting statements made by two defense witnesses.
However, the court of appeals distinguished Beals from the instant
case. The court noted that the stipulation in Beals "contained facts
that were, in the court's opinion, insignificant or not relevant to the
testimony of the defendant's two key witnesses."6 7 Further, the only
individual other than defense counsel who could offer comparable
information regarding the defense witnesses' problematic testi-
mony was defendant's sister. "Thus, when faced with the prospect
of the State calling defendant's own sister to contradict defendant's
witnesses, the court held that defense counsel employed a legiti-
mate trial strategy by offering the stipulation." 68
The court of appeals next looked at the decision in State v.
Crespo6 9 and found that the Supreme Court of Connecticut did not
even have to pass judgment on the effectiveness of counsel issue
62. Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 139.
63. Id.
64. See Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 137; see also note 34 and accompanying text.
65. Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 139.
66. 643 N.E.2d 789 (Il. 1994).
67. Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 140.
68. Id. at 141.
69. 718 A.2d 925 (Conn. 1998).
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because it was not adequately preserved for appeal. 70 Nonetheless,
"the court noted that counsel's decision to stipulate readily ascer-
tainable facts could have been a reasonable trial strategy" where de-
fense counsel's stipulation merely recounted his interaction with
the defendant when defendant granted consent for defense coun-
sel to disclose the location of the victim's body.71 The New York
Court of Appeals also highlighted the fact that the court in Crespo
compared its case to Beals and remarked that, in both cases, the
stipulation was strategically preferable for the defendant since the
information would have otherwise been offered by the prosecu-
tion. 72 Thus, Crespo was distinguished from defendant Berroa's
case.
Finally, the court of appeals reviewed People v. Baldi,73 a deci-
sion that was rendered by the court's predecessors some 21 years
earlier. 74 The court noted 3 distinctions between Baldi and the pre-
sent case: 1) Baldi's attorney was testifying on defendant's behalf
rather than against defendant's own witnesses; 75 2) Baldi's defense
attorney's stipulation constituted a legitimate trial strategy since the
objective was to further defendant's insanity defense; 76 and 3) the
defense counsel in Baldi was not the only source of the impeach-
ment evidence whereas Berroa's defense counsel is the only known
source of such evidence in the instant case. 77
Based upon its analysis of the facts in Berroa's case and its
reading of Beals, Crespo, and Baldi, the New York Court of Appeals
held that Dario Berroa was denied effective assistance of counsel in
his criminal trial. 78 The court found that defense counsel's stipula-
tion was "based on the assumed necessity of counsel's testimony
rather than a legitimate trial strategy. '79 Additionally, the court
noted that defense counsel's stipulation created a credibility con-
test between defense counsel and defendant's witnesses and, there-
70. Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 141.
71. Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 141.
72. Id.
73. 54 N.Y.2d 137 (1981)
74. Id.
75. Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 142.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 143.
79. Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 142 (emphasis added).
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fore, was not in defendant's best interests or useful in mitigating
the effect of damaging evidence as the appellate division had sug-
gested.80 Thus, defense counsel's stipulation was not necessary to
ameliorate the inconsistency that had arisen and, therefore, did not
constitute a legitimate trial strategy. Rather, the stipulation served
to augment the discrepancy between defense counsel's and defense
witnesses' contentions, and thereby created a conflict that impeded
Berroa's defense.
Also of interest is the court of appeals insistent yet unqualified
reminder that defense counsel was the only person who knew of the
faults in the defense witnesses' testimony. This fact would preclude
defense counsel from insisting that her stipulation was made in or-
der to soften the detrimental effects of obtaining this information
through another individual's testimony. However, this very same
fact also undermines the courts position that defense counsel
should not have disclosed the perjurious testimony through a stipu-
lation. If defense counsel is mandated by her ethical responsibilities
to disclose frauds upon the court,8 ' how else should she have ful-
filled her ethical obligation? This is a question that the New York
Court of Appeals left unanswered and also one that is likely to per-
plex defense counsel who find themselves in such situations. Per-
haps defense counsels' only option is to withdraw.
IV. CONCLUSION
The court found that Defendant Berroa was denied his consti-
tutionally protected right to the effective assistance of counsel when
his attorney entered a stipulation that was not a legitimate trial
strategy but, rather, a source of aggravation for the conflict that had
arisen at trial concerning the testimony of two defense witnesses. 82
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the appellate division's
affirmation of defendant's conviction for second-degree murder
and ordered a new trial.83
Michael P. McGuigan
80. See Berroa, 733 N.Y.S.2d at 60 and text at note 48.
81. See Berroa, 733 N.Y.S.2d 52.
82. See Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 139.
83. See Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d at 143.
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